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DISAGREEMENT ABOUT CHEVRON: IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THE “LAW OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION”?
ELIZABETH FISHER † AND SIDNEY SHAPIRO ††
Should the US Supreme Court overturn the two-step test in
Chevron? 1 One group of judges 2 and commentators 3 perceive
overthrowing Chevron as a battle for American constitutional
democracy and a fight to ensure that judges are the ultimate arbiters of
what law is. For another group, it just isn’t. From their perspective,
Chevron and its variations 4 involve the realities of judicial review that
arise from the doctrinal complexities entangled in courts adjudicating
on what is an acceptable interpretation of a statutory mandate. 5 They
point out that any doctrine that replaces Chevron will probably require
a court to engage in a type of legal analysis similar to that which it is
already carrying out because of the legal relevance of agency
expertise. 6
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1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions.”); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1223 n.6 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Reflecting th[e] belief that
bureaucrats might more effectively govern the country than the American people, the
progressives ushered in significant expansions of the administrative state . . . .”); GutierrezBrizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron . . .
permit[s] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power
and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the
Constitution of the framers’ design.”).
3. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A
Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018) (literature review).
4. E.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944).
5. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1297
(2016) [hereinafter Pierce, The Future of Deference].
6. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Without Chevron, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 79; Kristin E.
Hickman, To Repudiate or Merely Curtail? Justice Gorsuch and Chevron Deference, 70 ALA. L.
REV. 733, 737 (2019).
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These disagreements amount to two different groups, who
imagine administrative law in two completely different ways, talking
past each other. 7 Their disagreement cannot even be called a debate
since each group employs a different vocabulary and preoccupation.
Nor is it a political disagreement either. While the ideological roots of
some of those who wish to overturn Chevron are quite obvious, 8 their
dislike of the doctrine also stems from assumptions about what the law
should be. 9 By comparison, those who see Chevron as doctrinally
inevitable are ideologically and methodologically diverse. 10
What is not recognized is this: The root cause of disagreements
about overruling Chevron is whether administrative law is to be the law
of public administration. When administrative law is the “law of public
administration,” it addresses the competence of agencies to fulfill their
statutory duties. A competent agency has the legal authority to act as
well as the capacity to fulfill the legislative mission that Congress has
assigned to it. Historically, administrative law has focused on both of
these concerns, but many administrative lawyers since the 1970s have
adopted a narrower understanding, one that maintains that the sole
purpose of this area of law is the constraint of administrative agencies. 11
This exclusive focus on constraint has resulted in the anti-Chevron
movement that considers the legal significance of administrative
competence in terms that are far narrower than those that are in the
evidence from the administrative history of the United States. This
narrowing has also affected those who recognize the value of the
Chevron doctrine. They have been unable to articulate the legal
significance of administrative competence to the retention of the
doctrine because of the exclusive focus on constraint in contemporary
administrative law.

7. For an attempt to intersect, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO.
L.J. 1613 (2019) [hereinafter Sunstein, Chevron as Law] (engaging with the arguments of
contemporaneous critics of Chevron).
8. E.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE DUBIOUS MORALITY OF THE MODERN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, pt. 3 (2020). There have been ideological shifts in anti-Chevron thinking
over time, however. Id. at 1618.
9. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2120, 2154
(2016); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 854–55
(2020).
10. E.g., Nicholas R. Bednar, What To Do About Chevron—Nothing, 72 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 151, 153–54 (2019); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
the Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17.
11. ELIZABETH FISHER & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, ADMINISTRATIVE COMPETENCE:
REIMAGINING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9, 23 (2020).
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Our Essay shows how the recognition of administrative law as
addressing both the capacity and authority of agencies not only
explains what is behind the disagreement about jettisoning or retaining
Chevron, it also offers a constructive way forward to think about
judicial review of statutory interpretation. Parts I and II consider the
arguments for and against overturning Chevron. Part III explains why
we believe that the focus in administrative law should be on the
competence of public administration. While administrative lawyers
might regard the idea of administrative competence as strange, Part IV
provides a brief account of the rich history of the idea. In Part V, we
show that the administrative law imagination has narrowed so as to
exclude ideas about administrative competence in the last forty years.
We then demonstrate how administrative competence is legally
relevant to both steps in applying Chevron. Finally, Part VI considers
three implications of understanding Chevron as partially driven by
administrative competence. We note that how a judge approaches
Chevron is influenced by whether the judge has a narrow or a robust
understanding of administrative competence. We take issue with the
adoption of bright-line rules for statutory interpretation, including the
Chevron two-step test, and argue that the real challenge in statutory
interpretation does not concern governing agencies but instead
requires governing of the lower courts. 12
I. REASONS FOR OVERRULING CHEVRON
The Chevron test is well known and included in every U.S.
administrative law textbook:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with

12. This is an exploratory Essay. Readers can consult our recent book for a more detailed
account of administrative competence and its specific relevance to the Chevron doctrine. See
generally id. (describing our theory of how administrative law should incorporate understandings
of competence). More importantly, we hope that this Essay will encourage readers to read the
case law in a new light.
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respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. 13

Since the case was decided, this two-step test has attracted
considerable academic scrutiny. 14 That is inevitable, given that a court’s
review of an agency’s construction of a statute is practically important,
and also conceptually challenging in that it requires an engagement
with both law and administration. However, reliance on Chevron has
become more polarized and heated in the last five years primarily due
to the emergence of a group of scholars and lawyers who are animated
by a dual concern for upholding law and limiting administrative
power. 15
The concern for upholding law has focused on (1) stopping public
administration from “impermissibly supplanting the judiciary’s
constitutional duty to independently say what the law is (Article III
concerns),” and (2) “[dis]couraging members of Congress [from] overdelegat[ing] broad lawmaking authority to federal agencies in tension
with nondelegation values (Article I concerns).” 16 Justice Clarence
Thomas, for example, argues that the Chevron doctrine “wrests from
Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is.’” 17
And referencing § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 18 Justice Neil Gorsuch has stated that the APA’s
“unqualified command requires the court to determine legal
questions—including questions about a regulation’s meaning—by its
own lights, not by those of political appointees or bureaucrats who may
even be self-interested litigants in the case at hand.” 19
For these critics of Chevron, law is something pure, and its purity
must be maintained. Chevron deference puts at risk that purity.
Professor Richard Epstein, for example, describes the Chevron
13. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(footnotes omitted).
14. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (2012) [hereinafter Strauss, “Deference” Is
Too Confusing]; Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
551, 553 (2012) (noting Chevron has been cited in over 8,009 articles).
15. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Delegation and Its Discontents, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 185, 187 (2018).
16. Walker, supra note 3, at 113; see also Edwin E. Huddleson, Chevron Under Siege, 58 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 17, 23–31 (2019) (describing the main critiques of Chevron doctrine).
17. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
18. Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
19. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2432 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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doctrine as an “abject neglect of legal duty.” 20 For Professor Phillip
Hamburger, it “is contrary to the very nature of American
constitutional law to suggest that judges should lighten up when the
government acts outside the structures of power established by the
Constitution.” 21 Ultimately, these critics believe that Chevron allows
agencies to distort this true and independent meaning of the law.
The second concern, about administrative power, exists because
the Chevron doctrine is perceived as giving too much power to the
administrative state. 22 Chief Justice John Roberts has noted, for
example, his anxiety has been “heightened, not diminished, by the
dramatic shift in power over the last 50 years from Congress to the
Executive—a shift effected through the administrative agencies.” 23 Or
take Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s observation, writing before his
elevation to the Supreme Court, that “[i]n many ways, Chevron is
nothing more than a judicially orchestrated shift of power from
Congress to the Executive Branch.” 24 Public administration, if it is to
exist, therefore must be kept reined in so as to protect law. As
Professor Cass Sunstein has noted, “some of Chevron’s contemporary
critics are in the grip of a picture” that Chevron is a “green light to
lawlessness.” 25 Since these objections are more focused on where
power lies than a judge’s fidelity to the Constitution, they can come
across as more ideological. 26
For those who argue for the overruling of Chevron, the capacity
of agencies to fulfill their statutory mission does not figure into their
legal imagination. By “legal imagination,” we mean the collective
mental constructs that are deployed by lawyers and legal scholars in
thinking about law and how it operates. As Professor James Boyd
White once observed, the “life of imagination work[s] with inherited
materials and against inherited constraints.” 27 “The greatest power of
law,” he continued, “lies not in particular rules or decisions but . . . in

20. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 4.
21. Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1226 (2016).
22. Ronald A. Cass, Vive la Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and
Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1316 (2015).
23. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
24. Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2150.
25. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, supra note 7, at 1667–68.
26. Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative
Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41; Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative
Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 398 (2015).
27. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION xii (1973).
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the way it structures sensibility and vision.” 28 As we will see below,
expansion of legal imagination, by comparison, allows for
consideration of how an agency’s capacity as well as authority relates
to administrative law issues.
Since public administration is not part of how this group imagines
administrative law, it has no legal relevance. Take, for example,
Epstein’s critique of the second step of Chevron. He asks, “[W]hy is it
that the insertion of an administrative agency requires a fundamental
revision of responsibility on key questions of statutory construction?” 29
For Epstein, the answer is “the same devices needed to deal with
private law disputes also work for legislative and administrative actions
as well as constitutional theory.” 30 That is, there are only legal issues
subject to review by judges without regard to the role of administrative
agencies in our system of government. There is therefore no need to
engage in any form of deference to an agency’s construction of a
statute.
This approach to Chevron “is heavily constitutional, marked by a
formalist and originalist approach to the separation of powers, a deep
distrust of bureaucracy, and a strong turn to the courts to protect
individuals against administrative excess and restore the original
constitutional order.” 31 In short, as Professor Gillian Metzger has
noted, anti-Chevron thinking is “anti-administrativist.” 32
A good example, is Justice Gorsuch’s view of the role of public
administration expressed in his dissenting opinion in Gundy v. United
States, 33 which addressed whether the statute being challenged had laid
down an intelligible principle for delegation to the Attorney General:
To determine whether a statute provides an intelligible principle [for
delegation], we must ask: Does the statute assign to the executive only
the responsibility to make factual findings? Does it set forth the facts
that the executive must consider and the criteria against which to
measure them? And most importantly, did Congress, and not the
Executive Branch, make the policy judgments? Only then can we

28. Id. at xiii.
29. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 90.
30. Id. at 97.
31. Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3
[hereinafter Metzger, The Roberts Court].
32. Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 3–4, 33–46 (2017).
33. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
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fairly say that a statute contains the kind of intelligible principle the
Constitution demands. 34

This is an eye-wateringly narrow vision of the role of
administrative institutions in executing public policy. But it is a natural
consequence of thinking of law in the way described above.
For those seeking to overturn Chevron, law is a fixed and eternal
restraint. The emphasis is on “limited government.” 35 The starting
point for this argument is a certain vision of constitutional law and an
assumption about the dominance of the common law. 36 Law is law is
law.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST OVERRULING CHEVRON
Those recognizing the validity of Chevron, by comparison,
understand law as a thicker set of legal reasoning processes in which
administrative knowledge has legal relevance. They are not so much
defending Chevron as pointing out the inevitability of agency
interpretation being legally germane to determining what the law is. 37
They find there is room for more nuanced thinking about how courts
review agency interpretations in a variety of settings, 38 and even room
for doctrinal reform, 39 but they also find the arguments for
overthrowing Chevron misplaced. As Professors Nicholas Bednar and
Kristin Hickman note, “[C]asting Chevron as administrative law’s
bogeyman has always been a bit overwrought.” 40
These scholars understand administrative knowledge as having
legal relevance based on pragmatic and functional grounds, 41 which
include the “comparative institutional advantages of agencies” 42 and
34. Id. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
35. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law, 10 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 475, 477 (2016).
36. D. A. Candeub, Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 61 (2017).
37. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, supra note 7, at 1670.
38. E.g., Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra note 14, at 1143; Peter L. Strauss, A
Softer, Simpler View of Chevron, 43 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 7, 8 (2018); Cary Coglianese,
Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2017); Kristin E. Hickman &
Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 936–39 (2021).
39. Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the
Administrative State, 69 ALA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2017).
40. Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1392, 1461 (2017).
41. Metzger, The Roberts Court, supra note 31, at 45–46; Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s
Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1320 (2008).
42. Pierce, The Future of Deference, supra note 5, at 1313; see also Stephen Breyer, The
Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189,

118

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 70:111

“the virtues of placing interpretive decisions in the hands of
accountable and knowledgeable administrators.” 43 As Sunstein notes
regarding § 706 of the APA:
The text of the APA does not resolve the Chevron question. It is true
that courts “shall decide all relevant questions of law,” but the right
way to decide those questions might be to consult the agency’s view
and to accept it so long as it is reasonable. One more time: Perhaps
the law means what the agency says it means (so long as it is
ambiguous). 44

This group also acknowledges the nuance, malleability, and
inevitability of the doctrine as reflected in case law. 45 Professor Evan
Criddle notes, for example, that Chevron “offered a new vision of
continuous, flexible, agency-directed statutory administration.” 46 By
comparison, much of the criticism of the anti-Chevron movement
focuses on the doctrine as a “hornbook doctrine” of judicial review
rather than the doctrine as it is actually applied. 47 As Bednar and
Hickman sum up, Chevron is “first and foremost, just a standard of
review,” 48 and “standards of review generally do not determine case
outcomes. In the vast majority of cases, judicial evaluation of statutory
text, history, and purpose—not Chevron—determines whether courts
uphold an agency’s interpretation of a statute.” 49
What is notable of these defenders is that, unlike those who wish
to do away with Chevron, they do not resort to first principles; they do
not offer an overarching or theoretical explanation of why Chevron
matters. Their defense, as noted, is functional and pragmatic. They
recognize the legal relevance of administrative expertise, but they are
left with a conundrum. If the focus of administrative law is on
constraining agencies, as is generally assumed, why does administrative
expertise matter? Why is it legally relevant that institutions can and

2193 (2011) (“Courts find the notion of comparative expertise useful, indeed necessary, when
reviewing administrative decisions.”); Metzger, The Roberts Court, supra note 31, at 43–44 (noting
that “agencies’ greater political accountability, expertise, or congressional authorization” creates
a “push toward deference in law application, which easily spills over into law interpretation.”).
43. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 223.
44. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, supra note 7, at 1642 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
45. See supra notes 37–40.
46. Criddle, supra note 41, at 1282.
47. Pojanowski, supra note 9, at 856.
48. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 40, at 1398.
49. Id. at 1444.
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usually do host a complex institutional environment of expert public
administration?
As we explain next, the capacity of agencies is legally relevant
because administrative law is about the capacity and authority of public
administration—that is, its “competence.” This understanding dates
back to the Founding period and continues to this day, although it has
been overshadowed by the contemporary assumption that
administrative law is all about constraining administrative power.
Chevron itself reflects this focus on capacity and authority of agencies.
Those who support retaining Chevron recognize this association
although they lack the means to express it. Those who oppose Chevron
maintain that administrative law is only about constraint.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS THE LAW OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
Administrative law is essentially the law of public administration.
It constitutes, limits, and holds public administration to account. In
doing these things, it is concerned with the “competence” of public
administration, that is, its capacity to act and its authority to do so. The
reason is straightforward. Congress creates agencies for their capacity
to do things with authority, and they must thus be “[s]uitable, fit,
appropriate, proper” and “[p]ossess[] the requisite qualifications” 50 to
act legitimately, and thus legally, in relation to a particular issue.
Administrative competence exists because government cannot be
done through the articulation of rules alone. It requires expert
administrative capacity—not only to execute a set of legislative
mandates, but also to articulate what those mandates mean. American
citizens expect government to strengthen the economy, ensure safe
food, alleviate poverty, and much else. 51 Institutional capacity
transforms expectations such as those for clean water, clean air, and
safe workplaces into realizable realities. An institutional response is
necessary in order to undertake functions such as collecting and
assessing information; considering specific circumstances while
applying general principles; and/or the need for dynamic

50. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 603–04 (2d ed. 1989).
51. See Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov.
23, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-viewtheir-government [https://perma.cc/WB2Q-UJ9A] (finding that “[o]verwhelming numbers” of
Republicans and Democrats expected the government to play some role in thirteen areas,
including “ensuring safe food,” “strengthening the economy,” and “helping people get out of
poverty”).
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decisionmaking, among other things. 52 This is why Congress establishes
an agency as a set of coordinated types of expertise that can be
marshalled to determine how an agency’s mandate is to be fulfilled. 53
From a descriptive perspective, the recognition of competence
accurately reflects the reality of the law. As noted above, law
constitutes and empowers public administration. It is clear then that an
understanding of the institutions that this area of law governs should
be at its core. Those who teach corporation law would not presume that
courts should interpret the law without any appreciation of the
institutional arrangements that encompass a corporation. Those
supporting Chevron are implicitly pointing to that fact in the context of
agencies. They are not so much making an ideological argument for the
administrative state, but rather making an argument about a factual
state of affairs.
From a prescriptive perspective, the recognition of administrative
law as the law of public administration acknowledges public
administration and therefore the important role it plays in American
democracy. The creation of an agency and its mission is an act of
democratic will that government should address the problems or issues
that gave rise to the legislation. The recognition that an agency’s
legitimacy depends not only on whether it has legal authority to act,
but also on whether it has the capacity to do what it is supposed to do,
is not wishful thinking or aspiring to a utopia. It is making sure that the
substantive and complex role that public administration does play is
reflected in the law.
The idea of administrative law as the law of public administration
therefore reflects the expectations that the American people have of
public administration—both that it does not have unbounded power
and that it will be used for a set of purposes that the public expects to
be accomplished. Administrative law, so imagined, ensures such
capacity and authority by focusing on both of these elements of
competence.
When administrative law only focuses on constraining agencies,
not enabling them, public administration flounders in achieving
legislative mandates, which is anti-democratic. The legitimacy of public
52. See
ELIZABETH
FISHER,
RISK
REGULATION
AND
ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM 19–22 (2007) (explaining the factors necessitating administrative body
decisionmaking in the context of technological risk evaluation).
53. See FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 40 (noting how President Richard Nixon’s
comments reflected his view of the EPA’s capacity as including coordinating expertise, so that it
could work with the states to “produce regulatory standards that were clear and consistent for
regulated entities”).
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administration depends not only on its legal authority to act, but also
on the capacity to do so proficiently.
Professor Jerry Mashaw has noted “‘competence’ can convey a
concern for either ‘authority’ or ‘capacity.’” 54 Regarding public
administration, it refers to both. 55 Both are necessary for the “law” of
public administration. Legitimacy requires that an agency not exceed
its legal authority, and that it is able to comply with the “law” that
requires it to protect the public, the environment, or provide benefits
to the public.
The recognition that administrative law encompasses
considerations of the competence of public administration comes with
two challenges. The first is for administrative lawyers, as it requires
them to think about administrative law in an institutional way that is
alien to how the subject has been characterized for at least forty years.
The second challenge is to recognize the diversity inherent in this body
of law. Administrative and legal architecture will vary between
legislative and administrative contexts.
As Part IV will explain, the history of public administration dating
back to the Founding shows a concern with both capacity and
authority. It is only since the 1980s that the academic discussion has
shifted so significantly to make constraint the exclusive focus of
administrative law. This history, however, is unknown and
unappreciated by many lawyers today who are accustomed to limiting
how they imagine the role and purpose of administrative law. In order
to reorient administrative law back to its long-standing concern with
capacity and authority, the challenge is to reimagine administrative law
despite long ingrained ideas about it.
Once you acknowledge that administrative law is also about
capacity, it is necessary to understand that capacity, which is the second
challenge because of the diversity of the different types of
administrative capacity that exist. The Clean Water Act provides a
different set of interpretative issues than the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). 56
The Federal Communications Commission is a distinct type of
administrative institution from the Environmental Protection Agency
54. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry
into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 504–05 (2005).
55. FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 1.
56. Compare Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859–64
(1984) (considering the statutory text and legislative history of the CAA, as well as the EPA’s
interpretation, to interpret the term “stationary source” in the CAA), with Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715, 731–39 (2006) (applying canons of textual interpretation to determine the
meaning of “navigable waters” in the Clean Water Act).

122

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 70:111

(“EPA”). This diversity is partly due to the nature of different types of
problems that the administrative state administers: clean water, clean
air, social security, and so on. It is also due to over 200 years of
administrative evolution. As Justice Elena Kagan commented in her
dissent in Selia Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 57
“Our history has stayed true to the Framers’ vision. Congress has
accepted their invitation to experiment with administrative forms.” 58
Despite the need to understand the institutional capacity of
agencies, the nature of expertise and its legal relevance remains
elusive. 59 In Chevron itself, Justice John Paul Stevens remained rather
vague as to what he meant by agency expertise. 60 A Westlaw search of
the law review literature reveals almost no discussion of what expertise
is or how it works inside of agencies. 61 There is a general assumption
that agencies have experts because they hire people with specialized
training, but this is a very thin understanding of expertise. As we have
shown previously, expertise is a far more complicated set of
interrelated concepts and abilities. 62
An important aspect of these institutional arrangements is the
generation of internal norms and processes that establish what is
expected of agency employees and that define good decisionmaking. 63
Professional training, for example, includes a “code of conduct and
emphasis on adherence to it” and a “feeling of ethical obligation to
render service to clients . . . with emotional neutrality.” 64 Adding to the
internal motivation, professionals tend to this aspect of the education
and training because their peers and other professional civil servants

57. Selia L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
58. Id. at 2245 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Sidney Shapiro & Elizabeth Fisher, Chevron and the Legitimacy of “Expert” Public
Administration, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 471–73 (2013). For exceptions, see EDWARD
RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 117,
138–39 (2005); Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1239, 1297 (2017) (“The judicial warrant for monitoring and regulating a wide swath of
internal administrative law also reflects some degree of judicial distrust or ignorance of agencies’
capacities for self-governance.”).
60. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
61. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure To Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1098 n.7 (2015).
62. Id. at 1102–16; FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 2.
63. FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 3; Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law
Misunderstands How Government Works: The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 WASHBURN L.J.,
1, 5–8 (2013).
64. HAL G. RAINEY, UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 304–05
(4th ed. 2009).
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expect them to do so. 65 While we cannot do justice to the nature of all
of these arrangements here, we can point out that there is considerable
evidence of their efficacy. 66
The lack of understanding of public administration as a diverse
mixture of knowledge and accountability practices has led lawyers to
understand their choices in binary terms. Controlling the
administrative state is often viewed in conflict with public
administration delivering on its mandates. From this perspective, if
public administration is to be efficacious, it must be untrammeled by
law; it must have space in which law does not interfere. While there are
different variations of this binary, they all see the choice in
administrative law as between two options: either to interfere with
public administration or to leave it be. This choice is described in a
variety of ways: as between “law’s abnegation” 67 and the dominance of
singular vision of the rule of law; 68 as between rules and discretion; 69 or
as between deference and intensive review. 70
As the next Part explains, these binary understandings betray a
long history of concerns about both administrative competence and
authority although they reflect the more recent emphasis on constraint
over the last forty years. Nevertheless, the conception of administrative
law as fostering competence can still be found in more recent case law.
As we will discuss later, Chevron itself reflects this older history of
administrative law related to agency competence.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE COMPETENCE OVER TIME
Public administration “has had a prominent role, as both means
and object, in every major effort at political and governmental reform
associated with the political development of the United States.” 71 And
administrative competence has been a legal reality and aspiration of

65. Hugh Heclo, OMB and the Presidency—The Problem of “Neutral Competence,” 38 PUB.
INT. 80, 81–83, 92 (1975).
66. Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency:
Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 599–603 (2011).
67. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016).
68. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 7–9 (2014).
69. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY (1969).
70. Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma,
61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1763–64 (2012) (emphasizing that the fidelity to statute and reasoned
decisionmaking are touchpoints of judicial review to solve “deference dilemma”).
71. BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (2014).
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American constitutional democracy since before the Founding. 72
While we cannot fully document this history in this Essay, this Part will
provide a brief description that shows this long pedigree. 73
As a number of scholars have documented, attention to
competence was part and parcel of the American experiment in the
Founding and Federalist periods. 74 After the Constitution was ratified,
the Founders created new administrative structures to do the work of
government. 75 There were vigorous debates concerning how this was
to be done, and the necessity of public administration and competence
were “important themes in those debates.” 76
Once they were in charge of the government, President George
Washington and his cabinet members fashioned reporting and
management processes that fostered the capacity of government to act.
In particular, the Founders sought to ensure that the new institutions
would be staffed with people who could do their jobs. For this purpose
they relied on the reputation of a person or “fitness of character” as a
check on the honesty and competency of those who were hired. 77
As this brief description suggests, there was a “deadly fear of
governmental impotence” particularly among the Federalists. 78 The
courts acted consistently with this concern by recognizing that
Congress constituted a set of administrative departments (Department
of Foreign Affairs, the Department of War, and the Department of the
Treasury) to carry out the functions of government by considering both
the capacity of the government to act and its authority to do so. This
emphasis on competence can be seen even in Justice John Marshall’s
statement in Marbury v Madison 79 that “[i]t is emphatically the

72. See FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 4; WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1 (1996); JERRY L.
MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS
OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 29–78 (2012); see generally LEONARD WHITE, THE
FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1948).
73. For a more complete description of this history, see FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11,
at pt. II.
74. COOK, supra note 71, at ch. 2; JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE chs. 2–4 (1986); MASHAW, supra note 72, at chs.
2–4.
75. FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 109–21.
76. Id. at 119.
77. Id. at 123–24.
78. Leonard White, Public Administration Under the Federalists, 24 B.U. L. REV. 144, 180
(1944).
79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 80
In order to answer one of the legal questions before the Court in that
case—“Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?” 81—
the Court had to understand how the administrative process worked,
including the way in which the roles of the president in signing the
commission and the secretary of state in assigning a seal to it were fixed
in law. 82 This question also required the Court to determine whether
the administrative process of communicating the commission to an
individual was legally relevant or not. 83
In doing this, the Court considered the administrative competence
of the Department of State through a “legal” lens. 84 Given the Court’s
analysis, it is no surprise that Professor Thomas Merrill has eloquently
argued that the case is an administrative law decision. 85 Marbury is
“administrative law” because Chief Justice Marshall sought to
understand how Congress meant for the commission process to work
as a necessary step in determining the legality of Marbury’s
commission.
President Andrew Jackson and his successors overthrew the
previous administration’s reliance on the appointment of men from the
“natural aristocracy” as the most fit for ensuring the capacity of
government. 86 The Jacksonians assumed that any “able man” could
undertake administrative duties, 87 which seems like a move away from
competence, but a driving logic behind these reforms was that it would
deliver administrative accountability. Patronage was supposed to
accomplish this by making public administration an arm of the
Jacksonians’ political party, which would impose and maintain the
proper constraints on public administration. 88 It did nothing of the sort,
of course, but the fact remains that the spoils system was a vision of
competence, albeit a mistaken one.

80. Id. at 177.
81. Id. at 154.
82. Id. at 143–47.
83. Id. at 160.
84. See supra notes 80–83.
85. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative
Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481 (2004) (defining the paradigm of an administrative
law decision and explaining how Marbury fulfills this paradigm).
86. MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY IN
JACKSONIAN AMERICA 24, 27 (1975).
87. FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 132.
88. Id. at 131–32.
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New ideas of administrative competence emerged during the
Progressive Era. The “Progressives’ approach to governing,” as
Professors Stephen Skowronek and Stephen Engel have noted,
“informed successive waves of political innovation and embedded itself
in the operations, assumptions, and expectations of the modern
American state.” 89 Different thinkers, particularly Herbert Croly, John
Dewey, and Woodrow Wilson, expressed different concepts of how
best to ensure the competence of public administration. 90 Yet, a
common understanding of this era is that the Progressives’ promotion
of public administration was based on a commitment to “neutral
competence” derived from objective science. 91 It is true that the
Progressives were deeply troubled by the impact of partisan politics on
government, 92 but their main preoccupation was on how to develop a
robust concept of administrative competence in terms of both capacity
and accountability in light of the lessons learned from the previous
era. 93
Despite their reliance on expertise, the Progressives were not
arguing that the capacity of the government required independence
from political oversight as it is commonly assumed. Nor were they
arguing that expertise would furnish its own legitimacy as suggested by
Wilson’s proposal for a “science of administration” which would
operate “outside the proper sphere of politics.” 94 Rather, as Professor
David Rosenbloom has argued, his aim was to separate public
administration from partisan politics rather than a broader concept of
politics per se. 95 Wilson was reacting to the political corruption that had
plagued the Jacksonians, but he also recognized the limitations of

89. Stephen Skowronek & Stephen M. Engel, The Progressives’ Century, in THE
PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE
MODERN AMERICAN STATE 1 (Stephen Skowronek, Stephen M. Engel & Bruce Ackerman eds.,
2016).
90. FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 138–43.
91. See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 66, at 597–98 (describing the viewpoint that
systematically hiring administrative agency employees on the basis of expertise would render a
scientifically efficient agency).
92. See FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 255 (1900) (drawing
conclusions regarding the combination of centralized administration and a weak party system,
and vice versa); see also David H. Rosenbloom, The Politics –Administration Dichotomy in U.S.
Historical Context, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 57 (2008) (describing reformers’ belief in the
necessary separation of administrative decisionmaking from partisan politics).
93. See Brian J. Cook, Curing the Mischiefs of Faction in the American Administrative State,
46 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3–4 (2016).
94. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 197, 210 (1887).
95. Rosenbloom, supra note 92, at 57.
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“administrative science” and was aware that public administration had
to be responsive to democratic politics. 96
The New Deal did not produce a wholly original and virgin vision
of competence in government, but instead was an evolution of all that
had gone before. As in the Progressive era, New Dealers, such as Felix
Frankfurter, James Landis, and Jerome Frank, offered a whole range
of different administrative arrangements and thinking about
administrative competence. 97
The report of the Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure, which was the capstone of this attention to
administrative competence, is an exemplar of taking administrative
competence seriously. 98 With its detailed underlying reports of the
types of problems with which administrative decisionmakers were
dealing and the types of issues that emerged from such problems, the
Committee understood the importance and variety of administrative
structures used to grapple with the problems of the day. In short, it
acknowledged the capacity of public administration and proposed
administrative procedures that were crafted in accordance with that
understanding.
V. THE NARROWING OF HOW WE UNDERSTAND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
Our brief engagement with this history of the thinking about
administrative competence cannot do justice to this rich past. But even
this glimpse indicates how little of it fits into the binary narratives that
we now tell about administrative law. Recognition of the long pedigree
of administrative competence also underlines what administrative law
is really about. It is the law of public administration, and in being so, it
must directly relate to how public administration has developed in the
United States.
Ironically, the point at which scholars lost sight of administrative
competence was the time during which it was most needed—the
rulemaking revolution of the 1970s. 99 During that era, reformers
depended on government to regulate business, and they understood

96.
97.
98.

FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 138–41.
Id. at 148–52.
See generally ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., FINAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941).
99. FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 7.
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the importance of administrative expertise to achieve this aim, 100 but
they were also dubious concerning the ability of the administrative
status quo to administer new environmental, civil rights, health and
safety, and other laws. To use Professor Andrew McFarland’s
description, they were “civic skeptics.” 101
Their answer, as Professor Richard Stewart famously described
this era, was the “reformation” of administrative law, 102 which depicted
administrative law as largely a body of law concerned with interest
representation. It also fed the binary conception of administrative law
as either following law or agency discretion. Stewart, for example,
pointed to the “problem of discretion” as the central question in
administrative law. The solution was to create an interest group system
that enabled public interest groups to use the courts to hold the
government accountable. In other words, interest representation was
important because it was a form of control, 103 and Stewart considered
how the reformation set about making this happen.
What is striking in Stewart’s article is that he makes no mention of
how Congress had created legislative structures that required a new
form of administrative capacity. 104 The reformation was entirely a
matter of creating rights of public interest participation in the
administrative process that could neutralize the business advantage. 105
For Stewart and others, agencies had a blank check for discretionary
decisionmaking unless they were limited by the constraints of public
participation. 106 Philip Harter, for example, pictured an agency as
merely a “referee” among the “multitude of political forces [which]
influence the decision.” 107 As Bill Funk has objected, administrative
competence had been sidelined. 108

100. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
INTEREST LIBERALISM 78–79 (1986).
101. ANDREW S. MCFARLAND, PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBIES: DECISION MAKING ON
ENERGY 16–17 (1976).
102. Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1670 (1975).
103. Sidney A. Shapiro, Law, Expertise and Rulemaking Legitimacy: Revisiting the
Reformation, 49 ENV’T L. 661, 663 (2019).
104. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The “Reformation of Administrative Law”
Revisited, 31 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 782, 788–89 (2015).
105. Stewart, supra note 102.
106. Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law after the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith
in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 694–95 (2000).
107. Phillip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (1982).
108. William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public
Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENV’T L. 55, 90–91 (1987).
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Deborah Stone, in what she has termed the “rationality project,”
described the continued failure to engage with the actual institutional
contexts of public administration by identifying and summarizing the
range of accountability mechanisms that emerged after 1980. 109 These
accountability mechanisms require administrative agencies to justify
their decisions using processes of closely bounded analysis. 110 These
developments have been widely praised and criticized in the literature.
Our point here, however, is simply that the rationality project is a direct
manifestation of understanding the choices in administrative law as
only being between discretion and limiting that discretion.
VI. CHEVRON AND COMPETENCE
Now let us return to the disagreement about Chevron. As
discussed earlier, the dispute is between those who would overrule it
because it is the duty and province of the courts to decide “legal” issues,
and those who would retain it based on the legal inevitability of agency
interpretation being legally relevant to determining what is the law.
Both groups start with the current premise that the purpose of
administrative law is to constrain public administration, and in light of
this premise, the defenders lack a coherent explanation of why
expertise is legally relevant except that it obviously takes place and can
shed light on the meaning of ambiguous or vague statutory language.
Once, however, the premise of administrative law as pursuing the
competence of public administration is recognized, it is possible to
move past this binary by showing that Chevron requires a judge to
assess the nature of administrative competence at both Steps One and
Two. When administrative law is thought of in this more holistic way,
the legal relevance of administrative expertise is demonstrated.
Take the rule that was the focus of Chevron. The “bubble policy”
adopted by the EPA and at issue in the case undoubtedly reflected the
new Reagan administration’s more flexible approach to
administration, 111 but it also was the product of the agency’s expert

109. DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING
9–13 (3d ed. 1988).
110. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5–6 (1991).
111. The EPA’s rule treated all emissions from a single plant as amounting to a single
“statutory source,” or “bubble” under a provision of the Clean Air Act that required a permit
from a state regulator before the construction of any “new or modified stationary sources” of
pollution in states that had not attained air quality standards under previous legislation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7502(b)(6) (Supp. I 1977). This permitted a plant to modify or install a piece of equipment that
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capacity regarding how the CAA could be practically implemented. As
Professor Tom McGarity has explained, the EPA rulemaking blends
skills, knowledge, and experience about “the extent to which
compliance with relevant regulations can be induced in the real
world.” 112 The agency explained that a definition of “stationary source”
based on individual equipment acted “as a disincentive to new
investment and modernization.” 113 The EPA also stressed that the
definition of “stationary source” could not be seen in isolation, but in
a context where strict legal obligations were imposed on the states. 114
And they pointed out that there was a “lack of express statutory
language” and “conflicting Congressional signals.” 115 The resulting rule
was thus a product of the EPA’s expert capacity.
The conventional understanding of Chevron supports a
bifurcation where Step One involves a judicial interpretation of the
statutory language and Step Two requires deference to the agency’s
statutory interpretation. The expert capacity of the EPA is thus only
relevant at Step Two, and when it is, it displaces law. Sunstein, for
example, argued in 1990: “For the [first Chevron step], strictly legal
expertise seems relevant. For the [second Chevron step], it is the
agency that has a comparative advantage.” 116 This makes the case, as
Sunstein also noted, a “kind of counter-Marbury” doctrine for the
administrative state. 117 Since this reading reinforces that binary
discussed earlier, it is not surprising that the case has become a
flashpoint for ideological battles. 118
The conventional understanding of the case, however, misses
Justice Stevens’s understanding that legal questions of statutory
construction are entangled with understandings of administrative
competence and specifically expert capacity. In other words,
understandings of administrative competence inform the overall
emitted pollution if the total pollution emissions from the plant (i.e., the bubble) did not change.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
112. Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 57, 61 (1991).
113. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and
Submittal of Implementation Plans and Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46
Fed. Reg. 50,766, 50,768 (Oct. 14, 1981).
114. Id. at 50,768.
115. Id. at 50,769.
116. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2095
(1990).
117. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189 (2006) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero].
118. Hickman, supra note 6; Walker, supra note 3.

2021]

THE LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

131

process of statutory interpretation at both Steps One and Two. Both
steps require the court to assess the nature of the statute,
administrative competence, and the reasons that an agency gave for
their approach.
At Step One, Justice Stevens’s opinion took specific note of the
EPA’s capacity. He acknowledged that Congress left “gaps” in the
statute and assigned the EPA the “power” to fill them, 119 and found
therefore that “considerable weight” should be given to “an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer.” 120 After a considerable discussion of legislative history,
Justice Stevens described the 1977 Amendments as “a lengthy,
detailed, technical, complex, and comprehensive response to a major
social issue.” 121 He went on to review the history of how the EPA had
interpreted the word “source” and then concluded, “Our review of the
EPA’s varying interpretations of the word ‘source’ . . . convinces us that
the agency primarily responsible for administering this important
legislation has consistently interpreted it flexibly—not in a sterile
textual vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in
a technical and complex arena.” 122
Step One is usually framed as a question of congressional intent,
but it is actually a question about what type of institutional structure
Congress created, which makes it an issue of administrative
competence. When Justice Stevens analyzed the issue of what
Congress expected the EPA to do under the Act, he was asking the
question whether Congress established the capacity in the EPA to
define “source” for purposes of the CAA. This inquiry was relevant to
determining whether Congress had defined the term or delegated that
power to the EPA.
At Step Two, it is tempting to read Justice Stevens’s opinion as
judicial deference to the EPA’s interpretation, and some of the
language can be seen as supporting this view. 123 Viewed this way, as
noted earlier, the case supports a bifurcation that interprets Step One

119. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
120. Id. at 844.
121. Id. at 848.
122. Id. at 863.
123. Justice Stevens noted that “perhaps” Congress had not spoken precisely to the question
at issue, “thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the statute would be in a better position” to choose an appropriate policy. Id. at
865. He also stated deference was appropriate in light of the agency’s political accountability. Id.
at 865–66. And he acknowledged that courts did not have such competence. Id. at 866.
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as a judicial interpretation of the statutory language and Step Two as
requiring “deference” to the agency’s statutory interpretation.
This characterization, however, misses Justice Stevens’s
understanding that legal questions of statutory construction are
entangled with understandings of administrative competence. In other
words, understandings of administrative competence inform the
overall process of statutory interpretation at both Steps One and Two.
Both steps require the court to assess the nature of the statute,
administrative competence, and the reasons that an agency gives for
their approach.
At Step Two, the common understanding is that a court will
“defer” to the agency’s construction of the statute because Congress
has delegated the resolution of an ambiguity to the agency. But Justice
Stevens “deferred” only after he determined that the EPA had used its
capacity for administrative expertise in a manner that produced a
reasonable definition of the term “source.” The fact that the agency
applied its capacity in a reasonable manner was therefore relevant to
the legal issue of whether the resolution was “permissible.” 124
After Chevron was decided, the Supreme Court created what is
now called “Step Zero” in which there is a preliminary determination
of whether Chevron applies at all. 125 If a court decides at Step Zero that
Chevron does not apply, it avoids the necessity of “deferring” to the
agency’s construction of an ambiguous term or terms at Step Two.
Instead, the responsibility of defining the terminology falls to the court.
Step Zero also requires a determination to be made about whether any
institutional structure or process is legally relevant. At Step Zero, there
is a judicial analysis of whether Congress actually created
administrative capacity that an agency could use to resolve the policy
issues involved in resolving a statutory ambiguity.
As an example, Justice David Souter in United States v. Mead
Corp., 126 engaged in a study of the U.S. Customs Service’s practices to
determine whether tariff classifications were subject to the Chevron
test. He noted that “[a]ny suggestion that rulings intended to have the
force of law are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an
agency’s 46 scattered offices is simply self-refuting.” 127
Finally, the same focus on whether Congress created the requisite
institutional capacity arises when a court applies the “major questions”
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 843.
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 117, at 193–94.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Id. at 233.
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exception, in which a court considers whether Congress intended to
delegate an “interpretative” issue with significant policy implications
to an agency. 128 In Food and Drug Administration v. Brown and
Williamson Corp., 129 for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor for
the majority construed the administrative competence of the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) in narrow terms so that it could only
act in certain ways when certain evidentiary criteria were fulfilled. 130
The existence of tobacco-specific legislation reinforced this view. 131 By
comparison, Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent concluded that
Congress’s intent had been to delegate to the FDA’s competence the
definition of what products constitute a “drug” for purposes of FDA
regulation. 132
What these examples highlight is that administrative competence
is not a byword for deference. Rather highlighting it underscores the
legal significance of the capacity and authority of any administrative
institution in questions concerning statutory interpretation. That is
inevitable given that administrative law is the law of public
administration.
VII. THREE INSIGHTS ABOUT CHEVRON
Once Chevron is understood as being about administrative
competence, it is possible to see how understandings of administrative
competence inform the application of Chevron in all of its varieties.
Besides being a powerful example of the importance of understanding
administrative law as the law of public administration, this approach
opens up three insights about the case law.
First, it becomes clear that how judges approach Step One is
influenced by whether they adopt a restrictive or narrow understanding
of administrative capacity or a more expansive understanding.
Consider, for example, Environmental Protection Agency v. EME
Homer City Generation, 133 which concerned an EPA rule that
interpreted the provision of the CAA that addresses an upwind state’s

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 117, at 187, 236–42.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 137–39.
Id. at 165 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. 489 (2014).
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contribution to a downward state’s air pollution. 134 Among other
considerations, the EPA took the cost of abatement into account in
setting the limitations for an upwind state. The majority, which upheld
the construction of the statute at the second step of Chevron,
recognized the complexity of assessing an upwind state contribution
and that the CAA required “the Agency to address a thorny causation
problem.” 135 As such, the expertise of the EPA was in “crafting” a
solution to a multifaceted problem. 136 After reviewing what the EPA
did, the majority found it a permissible construction.
Justice Antonin Scalia, who dissented along with Justice Thomas,
concluded that the statute was clear on its face and it should be
resolved at Step One of Chevron. 137 This was because he understood
the EPA’s expertise as one of quantitative assessment, 138 which
involved only calculating limitations on downwind pollution. He noted,
“I am confident, however, that EPA’s skilled number-crunchers can
adhere to the statute’s quantitative (rather than efficiency) mandate by
crafting quantitative solutions.” 139 This example highlights that agency
expertise is not only legally relevant, but that how such expertise is
understood by judges will figure into how the doctrine is applied.
Second, understanding the two-step test as a binary choice
between law and discretion is unhelpful because it draws bright lines
between law and policy and law and administration. As a result, it
skews focus away from administrative competence. Although the idea
that Chevron is about administrative competence is not wellrecognized, scholars have exposed the problems with characterizing
Chevron as a two-step test. 140 One problem is there are now more than
two steps with the arrival of Step Zero and the “major questions

134. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (interpreting 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2006)).
135. EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. at 514.
136. Id. at 496–97.
137. Id. at 525–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 531.
139. Id. at 535.
140. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2359 (2018) (arguing that Chevron Step Two is “perfunctory” in many cases); Richard
Murphy, The Last Should Be First-Flip the Order of the Chevron Two-Step, 22 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 431 (2013) (describing the confusion arising from Chevron’s two-step framework);
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597
(2009) (“Chevron, properly understood, has only one step.”); Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead;
Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (2015) (noting that agencies rarely lose at Step
Two).
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doctrine.” Another is the variable reasoning that judges employ
regarding these various “steps.” As explained in the last Part, once you
recognize that Chevron is about administrative competence, the
various steps have a common starting point. By fully considering
administrative competence, lawyers can better understand the
Chevron doctrine with which they have been struggling for so long.
Finally, the merit of the two-step test concerns how it governs the
lower courts rather than how it governs administrative action. There is
nothing new in highlighting this. 141 As Professor Richard Pierce
recently noted, one of the virtues of the two-step test is that “it
increases the number of federal statutes that have the same meaning
throughout the country.” 142 Likewise, Professor Richard Murphy
recently argued that there are reasons for overturning Chevron due to
its doctrinal complexity, but any replacement should acknowledge the
value of the two-step doctrine in “block[ing] horizontal stare decisis
from distorting review of the merits of an agency’s statutory
construction.” 143 And Robert Adler and Brian House have pointed out,
the doctrinal confusion concerning the “Waters of the United States”
is a case in point. 144
When you understand administrative law as the law of public
administration, the important and challenging role that a decentralized
court system has in interacting with administrative competence is
brought into focus. The issue is less about judicial power versus
administrative power and more about how Chevron, as a form of
essential outside-in accountability, 145 frames the way in which
decentralized courts can ensure meaningful accountability. When
administrative law is understood in binary terms, however, this
function is hidden.
Overall, these three insights point to a very different way forward
for administrative law. It is a way forward in which the development of
a robust body of precedent is grounded in the institutional reality of
the subject instead of attempting to draw sharp lines between law and
administration. In this regard, we are reminded of Professor Jeremy
141. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Dialogue
with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 903 (2007).
142. Richard J. Pierce, The Combination of Chevron and Political Polarity Will Have Awful
Effects, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 91, 103 (2021).
143. Murphy, supra note 41, at 8.
144. Robert W. Adler & Brian House, Atomizing the Clean Water Act: Ignoring the Whole
Statute and Asking the Wrong Questions, 50 ENV’T L. 45, 52–57 (2020).
145. Shapiro & Wright, supra note 66, at 578; Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual, & Wendy
Wagner, Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert Agencies, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1688 (2015).
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Waldron’s perception about the rule of law. Waldron explains: “We
want to be ruled thoughtfully. Or to put it in a more democratic idiom,
we want our engagement in governance to be thoughtful and reasoned,
rather than rigid and mechanical.” 146 Thoughtfulness for Waldron is
“the capacity to reflect and deliberate, to ponder complexity and
confront new and unexpected circumstances with an open mind.” 147
The existence of the administrative state with its capacity and
authority—its competence—is an example of this commitment to
thoughtfulness. Judicial review in ensuring meaningful accountability
should promote such thoughtfulness.
CONCLUSION
The dispute concerning Chevron is ultimately about the nature of
law in administrative law, and whether administrative competence
does and should figure into the administrative law imagination. It is a
choice between recognizing the reality of the American polity and not
doing so. The desirable way forward is to accept that reality and ensure
administrative law is the law of public administration. Not least
because it ensures that, as lawyers, we do not engage in pretense about
what is going on in the administrative state.
But there is a problem. While the history of administrative law is
rich in ideas of administrative competence, we have seen such
discourses recede since 1980, resulting in ideas of administrative
competence that are thin and threadbare. To talk of the legal relevance
of public administration and administrative competence now appears
paradoxical. It is just a case of appearances, however. While ideas of
administrative competence may not animate administrative law
scholarship, they are clearly present in the case law. As we have shown,
it is inevitable that the application of the Chevron test is informed by
understandings of administrative competence. 148
Professor Brian Tamanaha notes that “no existing theory of law
adequately accounts for government entities that utilize legal
mechanisms in myriad ways in their activities.” 149 Tamanaha is correct
in one sense. The current binary that dominates administrative law
reflects a lack of proper engagement with administrative competence.
The way in which Chevron is commonly understood is Exhibit A.
146. Jeremy Waldron, Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law, 18 BRIT. ACAD. REV. 1, 1 (2011).
147. Id.
148. For additional examples, see FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 8; Shapiro &
Fisher, supra note 59, at 471–83.
149. BRIAN TAMANAHA, A REALISTIC THEORY OF LAW 126 (2017).
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Administrative law is therefore not a true law of public administration,
and there are attempts to make it less so by those who argue for the
overruling of Chevron. But Tamanaha is wrong in another sense.
Chevron implicitly recognizes administrative competence. Likewise,
there is a rich and varied history of administrative competence in which
administrative law is entangled. The problem is that in the last forty
years there has been a narrowing of the administrative law imagination.

